



Workshop Safety & AI – DataIA

23/09/2020

VULNERABILITY OF PERSON RE-IDENTIFICATION MODELS TO METRIC ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS

*CEA-List,
Université Paris-Saclay,
Vision and Learning Lab for Scene Analysis*

Quentin Bouniot, Romaric Audigier, Angélique Loesch



PERSON RE-IDENTIFICATION

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PERSON RE-IDENTIFICATION

Query




Gallery



- **Open-set Ranking problem:**
 - Different classes between training and testing
 - Ranking a Gallery from most to least similar to a Query

PERSON RE-IDENTIFICATION

Query



Gallery

Jean Dos



Jeanne Dos



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PERSON RE-IDENTIFICATION




Query



Gallery


Jean Dos

Jeanne Dos →



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METRIC LEARNING




- Low distance with same person
- High distance with different person

METRIC ATTACKS

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
CLASSIFICATION ATTACKS: TARGETED ATTACKS



- **Using the class information:**

- Attack models at the logit level
- Keep class predictions as far away as possible from their proper class


CLASSIFICATION ATTACKS: NON-TARGETED ATTACKS



- **Using the class information:**

- Attack models at the logit level
- Keep class predictions as far away as possible from their proper class


METRIC ATTACKS: PULLING GUIDE



- As class information is not available in open-set: Attack the metric
- We need a *guide* ! (pushing / pulling)
- Existing attack: SG. FGSM/IFGSM/MIFGSM [2]

[2]: Bai S. et al. 2019. *Metric Attack and Defense for Person Re-identification*. In arXiv.



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[2]: Bai S. et al. 2019. *Metric Attack and Defense for Person Re-identification*. In arXiv.

METRIC ATTACKS: ARTIFICIAL GUIDE



- If we don't have access to additional images: Where is the guide ?
- Construct an *artificial guide* from the image under attack
- Existing attack: ODFA [1]


[1]: Zhedong Z. et al. 2018. *Open-set Adversarial Examples*. In arXiv.

OUR ATTACKS

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



CONTRIBUTION: SELF METRIC ATTACK (SMA)




- Use the *image under attack* as an **artificial pushing guide**
- Move a *noisy copy* of the image away from the original image

CONTRIBUTION: MULTIPLE PUSHING GUIDES




- With multiple images, use multiple guides
- Better approximation of the best direction

CONTRIBUTION: MULTIPLE PULLING GUIDES



- With multiple images, use multiple guides
- Better approximation of the best direction

CONTRIBUTION: FURTHEST-NEGATIVE ATTACK (FNA)





- If we have a lot of images available:
 - Combine multiple **pushing guides** and **pulling guides** from the **furthest** identity cluster
 - Make full use of the information (*images*) available

DEFENDING RE-IDENTIFICATION MODELS

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GUIDE-SAMPLING ONLINE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING (GOAT)


Training
Batch



- **Special care for *adversarial training* [3] with *metric attacks*:**
 - No guarantee that multiple images have the same identity in a training batch

[3]: Madry A. et al. 2017. *Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks*. In ICLR 2018.

GUIDE-SAMPLING ONLINE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING (GOAT)



- **Special sampling strategy:**
 - For each training image, sample **pushing guides** and **pulling guides**
- **Use the guides sampled to generate an adversarial batch**

- Security and robustness are critical for Person Re-Identification
- Metric attacks require a guide:
 - To increase the distance with the same identity (**pushing guide**)
 - To decrease the distance with another identity (**pulling guide**)
- We proposed two metric attacks depending on availability of images:
 - **Self Metric Attack (SMA)**: strong self-sufficient attack
 - **Furthest-Negative Attack (FNA)**: use all the information available
- We improve robustness with GOAT:
 - Extension of Adversarial Training [3] for an efficient defense against metric attacks

[3]: Madry A. et al. 2017. *Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks*. In ICLR 2018.

THANK YOU FOR LISTENING ! FEEL FREE TO ASK QUESTIONS

MORE INFO:

Paper:

Q. Bouniot, R. Audigier and A. Loesch,
« *Vulnerability of Person Re-Identification Models to Metric Adversarial Attacks* »,
2020 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW),
Seattle, WA, USA, 2020, pp. 3450-3459,
doi: 10.1109/CVPRW50498.2020.00405.

Technical Blogpost:

https://qbouniot.github.io/article/2020/05/06/adv_reid.html

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